Marketplaces and snapshots¶

The core API: registration, ingestion, the approval gate and provenance. All paths are relative to /api.

With role enforcement enabled: registration and sync-mode changes require admin; ingest, approve, reject, re-vet, and waiver create/delete require approver of the marketplace (or admin) — resolved server-side from the addressed snapshot or waiver where the route carries an id; every GET on this page stays open to any session.

Machine reach. marketplaces:read covers GET /marketplaces, GET /catalog and a snapshot's /content, /licenses, /provenance and /release-age; snapshots:read covers /diff, /file, /files, /vetting, /fetchers and /four-eyes; marketplaces:register, marketplaces:ingest, vetting:run, sync:write and waivers:read cover the corresponding mutations and the waiver listing. Approve, reject, waiver create, waiver delete, snapshot delete and snapshot restore are reachable by no scope at all — they publish, refuse or retract content. See Machine API credentials.

Representations¶

Marketplace

{"id":1,"name":"acme","url":"https://github.com/acme/skills.git",
 "createdAt":"2026-08-15T09:00:00Z","registeredBy":"dana",
 "forge":"github","forgeProject":"acme/skills",
 "description":"Acme internal skills","upstreamUpdatedAt":"2026-08-14T18:20:00Z",
 "snapshots":[]}

Snapshot

{"id":42,"marketplaceId":1,"sha":"3f9c2ab...","state":"held",
 "violation":null,"createdAt":"2026-08-15T09:01:00Z","ingestedBy":"ingrid",
 "decidedBy":null,"decidedAt":null}

registeredBy and ingestedBy are the supply-side identities the four-eyes rule compares a reviewer against. ingestedBy is a principal for an on-demand ingest or a push, scheduler or webhook for an automated trigger, and null for a snapshot ingested before the actor was recorded; registeredBy is null for a marketplace registered before it was.

state is one of held, approved, rejected, revoked. A revoked snapshot also carries revokedBy and revokedAt, and its violation says what re-vetting found. See Re-vetting approved content.

`POST /marketplaces`¶

Register a marketplace. Fetches nothing.

Body — {name, url?, ref?, origin?, pushPolicy?}

$ curl -X POST localhost:8080/api/marketplaces \
    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    -d '{"name":"acme","url":"https://github.com/acme/skills.git"}'

origin decides where the content comes from:

`origin`	`url`	Content arrives by
`upstream` (default)	required	the gateway fetching the upstream default branch
`hosted`	must be absent	a publisher pushing to `/publish/{name}`

pushPolicy applies to a hosted marketplace only: append-only (the default) refuses a non-fast-forward push, allow-rewrite permits one and records both tips on the ledger. See Publishing first-party skills.

Status	Cause
201	Registered; returns the marketplace.
400	URL scheme not allowlisted, `ref` present and not `main`, a hosted registration supplying a `url`, an upstream one omitting it, or a `pushPolicy` on an upstream marketplace.
409	Name already exists.
422	Name fails `^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]*$`, or an unknown `origin`/`pushPolicy`.

The 400 cases are trust-boundary rejections — see Compatibility and allowlists.

`GET /marketplaces`¶

All marketplaces, each with its forge metadata and full snapshot list. This is the portal's primary query; there is no per-marketplace endpoint.

200 — array of marketplaces.

`POST /marketplaces/{name}/ingest`¶

Clone the source's default branch into quarantine and pin the tip commit as refs/snapshots/{sha}. Creates a snapshot in state held. For a hosted marketplace the source is its own origin repository, and a push already does this — the endpoint stays available to re-ingest.

$ curl -X POST localhost:8080/api/marketplaces/acme/ingest

Status	Cause
201	Snapshot captured; returns it.
404	Unknown marketplace.
502	Ingestion failed — upstream unreachable, or the manifest was rejected.

Ingesting a commit already captured does not create a second snapshot.

Upstream sync¶

Automated ingestion triggers (GW_0056–GW_0060). Modes and the secret lifecycle are described in Syncing from upstream automatically.

`PUT /marketplaces/{name}/sync`¶

Set how upstream content reaches quarantine: on-demand (default), scheduled, or webhook. No mode bypasses approval.

$ curl -X PUT localhost:8080/api/marketplaces/acme/sync \
    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"mode":"webhook"}'

{"marketplace":{"name":"acme","syncMode":"webhook","...":"..."},
 "webhookSecret":"9f2c...ab41"}

webhookSecret is present only when the new mode is webhook, and only in this response — setting webhook mode again rotates it, and leaving the mode discards it. The change is audit-logged as sync-mode-changed.

Status	Cause
200	Mode changed; returns the marketplace, plus the secret when entering webhook mode.
404	Unknown marketplace.
422	Not one of the three modes.

`POST /hooks/{marketplace}`¶

The inbound forge webhook — not under /api, and the only endpoint reachable without an OIDC session or a PAT. Authenticated solely by an HMAC-SHA256 signature of the exact raw request body in the GitHub-compatible X-Hub-Signature-256: sha256=<hex> header, verified in constant time against the marketplace's secret.

The payload is ignored: a valid signature only triggers an asynchronous ingestion of the registered upstream URL's default branch — nothing in the body is read. The ingestion is recorded on the ledger with the actor webhook and lands held like any other.

Status	Cause
202	Signature valid; ingestion queued.
403	Missing or invalid signature. Nothing was ingested.
404	Unknown marketplace, or its sync mode is not `webhook`.
413	Body exceeds `skills-gateway.sync.max-webhook-body-bytes`; rejected before verification.

Virtual catalog¶

The synthesized one-URL catalog (GW_0061–GW_0063); see The virtual catalog.

`GET /catalog`¶

The catalog revision the facade is serving at /git/{catalog-name}.

{"sha":"a91b...","generatedAt":"...","constituents":[
  {"marketplace":"acme","sha":"3f9c..."}]}

200 · 404 catalog disabled or not generated yet.

`POST /catalog/rebuild`¶

Regenerate now from what every marketplace is serving. Approvals and revocations already do this on their own; this is the on-demand repair path. Audit-logged as catalog-rebuilt with the acting identity.

200 — the new revision · 404 catalog disabled.

`GET /snapshots/{id}/content`¶

What the snapshot declares — the review surface. Works on held snapshots, because reviewing must not require serving.

{"snapshotId":42,"sha":"3f9c2ab...","state":"held",
 "plugins":[{"name":"acme-tools","description":"Deployment helpers",
             "source":"./plugins/acme-tools",
             "skills":[{"name":"deploy","path":"skills/deploy/SKILL.md"}]}]}

200 · 404 unknown snapshot.

`GET /snapshots/{id}/licenses`¶

The licenses the snapshot declares, each with its standing under the configured allow/ban policy. Detection is deterministic — SPDX ids resolved from license/copying files anywhere in the tree, SPDX-License-Identifier tags inside them, and the marketplace manifest's license metadata fields — and runs over the content pinned to the snapshot's commit SHA, so the report exists for every snapshot, held included.

{"snapshotId":42,"sha":"3f9c2ab...",
 "licenses":[
   {"spdxId":"MIT","source":"file","location":"LICENSE",
    "declared":null,"evaluation":"OK"},
   {"spdxId":null,"source":"file","location":"plugins/acme-tools/COPYING",
    "declared":null,"evaluation":"UNKNOWN"},
   {"spdxId":"ISC","source":"manifest",
    "location":".claude-plugin/marketplace.json#plugins[acme-tools].license",
    "declared":"ISC","evaluation":"OK"}],
 "allowed":["MIT","Apache-2.0"],"banned":["AGPL-3.0"]}

A spdxId of null is the unknown license state — the source identified no known license. An empty licenses array means the snapshot carries no license information at all. evaluation is one of OK, BANNED, NOT_ALLOWED, UNKNOWN.

This read reports current policy truth: it is recomputed under the configuration in force, complementing the gateway's own SBOM endpoint (/actuator/sbom) and the content inventory above as the supply-chain read surface. The evidence the approval gate acted on is the recorded vetting run, not this report.

200 · 404 unknown snapshot.

Snapshot preview¶

Read-only inspection of a snapshot's pinned content: the file tree, individual files, and the diff against what the marketplace currently serves. Everything resolves through the quarantine repository's object store at the pinned commit — paths are matched against tree entries only, so a path the commit does not contain (traversal shapes included) is simply not found. Works on held snapshots: inspecting content must not require serving it.

These reads return raw held content, so unlike the metadata reads above they are privileged while role enforcement is enabled (skills-gateway.roles.enabled=true): an admin, or an approver of the snapshot's marketplace. Everyone else gets 403. With enforcement at its default (off) they are open to any authenticated session.

`GET /snapshots/{id}/files`¶

Every path in the pinned commit's tree, with blob sizes. The listing is capped at 2000 entries; "truncated": true says it was cut.

{"snapshotId":42,"sha":"3f9c2ab...","truncated":false,
 "entries":[{"path":".claude-plugin/marketplace.json","size":180},
            {"path":"plugins/acme-tools/skills/deploy/SKILL.md","size":841}]}

200 · 403 enforcement enabled, no applicable role · 404 unknown snapshot.

`GET /snapshots/{id}/file?path={path}`¶

One blob, as text for rendering only. Content is cut at 128 KiB with "truncated": true and the full size still reported; a blob detected as binary returns metadata with no text at all.

{"snapshotId":42,"path":"plugins/acme-tools/skills/deploy/SKILL.md",
 "size":841,"binary":false,"truncated":false,"text":"# Deploy\n..."}

200 · 403 enforcement enabled, no applicable role · 404 unknown snapshot, or the path is not in the pinned tree.

`GET /snapshots/{id}/diff`¶

The delta a reviewer decides: added, modified and removed paths between the pinned commit and the marketplace's currently served commit (the published repository's served tip — the same commit a git fetch returns), with a unified text diff per non-binary entry under the same 128 KiB cap. The entry list is capped at 500 with a truncated marker.

When the marketplace serves nothing — never approved, or its content was revoked or unpublished — baselineSha is null and every path is reported as added, without diff text: approving the snapshot would serve all of it.

{"snapshotId":43,"sha":"9d41f00...","baselineSha":"3f9c2ab...","truncated":false,
 "entries":[{"path":"plugins/acme-tools/skills/deploy/SKILL.md","type":"modified",
             "binary":false,"truncated":false,
             "diff":"--- a/...\n+++ b/...\n@@ -1 +1 @@\n-old\n+new\n"}]}

200 · 403 enforcement enabled, no applicable role · 404 unknown snapshot.

`GET /snapshots/{id}/vetting`¶

The snapshot's latest vetting chain run: each connector's verdict in chain order, the findings behind it, the waivers currently suppressing any of them, and the fail-closed effective aggregate that gates approval. A snapshot the chain has never run against reports "outcome":"BLOCKED" and "run":null.

{"snapshotId":12,"outcome":"CLEAR_WITH_WAIVERS","recordedOutcome":"BLOCKED",
 "run":{"runId":5,"snapshotId":12,"trigger":"ingestion","outcome":"BLOCKED",
        "startedAt":"...","finishedAt":"...",
        "verdicts":[
          {"verdictId":9,"connector":"secret-scan","position":0,"state":"FAIL",
           "detail":"1 finding(s); worst critical","reportUrl":null,
           "findings":[{"id":"aws-access-key-id","severity":"CRITICAL",
                        "location":"plugins/hello/DEPLOY.md:5",
                        "message":"an AWS access key id is committed in this file"}]},
          {"verdictId":10,"connector":"prompt-injection","position":1,
           "state":"PASS","detail":null,"reportUrl":null,"findings":[]}]},
 "suppressed":[{"connector":"secret-scan","ruleId":"aws-access-key-id",
                "location":"plugins/hello/DEPLOY.md:5","waiverId":3,
                "approvedBy":"alice","expiresAt":"2026-09-30T23:59:59Z"}],
 "uncovered":[],
 "waivers":[{"id":3,"marketplace":"corp-marketplace","ruleId":"aws-access-key-id",
             "scope":"SNAPSHOT","scopeValue":"a1b2c3…","justification":"documented dummy key",
             "approvedBy":"alice","createdAt":"...","expiresAt":"2026-09-30T23:59:59Z",
             "revokedAt":null,"revokedBy":null,"active":true}],
 "connectors":[{"name":"secret-scan","order":100,"description":"..."},
               {"name":"prompt-injection","order":200,"description":"..."}]}

Field	Meaning
`outcome`	The effective outcome — the one that gates approval: `CLEAR`, `CLEAR_WITH_WAIVERS`, or `BLOCKED`. Recomputed on every request from the run and the waivers active at that instant.
`recordedOutcome`	What the connectors themselves concluded: `CLEAR` or `BLOCKED`. Never rewritten by a waiver.
`suppressed`	The findings an active waiver is currently removing from the computation.
`uncovered`	The blocking findings no active waiver covers — the waivers approval still needs.
`waivers`	The marketplace's waivers whose rule appears in this run, active and lapsed alike.

state is one of PASS, WARN, FAIL, ERROR, PENDING; severity is one of INFO, LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH, CRITICAL. What each means is described in Vetting — the connector chain.

Status	Cause
200	The latest chain run, its waivers, and the configured chain.
404	Unknown snapshot.

Vetting waivers¶

A waiver accepts one finding rule, on one marketplace, within one scope, until one expiry. See Waiving a vetting finding for the task and the concept page for the matching rules.

`POST /snapshots/{id}/waivers`¶

{"ruleId":"aws-access-key-id","scope":"SNAPSHOT",
 "justification":"documented dummy key in the fixtures directory",
 "expiresAt":"2026-09-30T23:59:59Z"}

Field	Required	Notes
`ruleId`	yes	The finding's stable rule id.
`scope`	yes	`SNAPSHOT` or `PATH`.
`path`	for `PATH`	Repository-relative; must not contain `..`. Ignored for `SNAPSHOT`.
`justification`	yes	Free text; blank is refused.
`expiresAt`	yes	Must be in the future. There is no unlimited waiver.

The marketplace — and, for SNAPSHOT scope, the commit SHA — are taken from the snapshot, so a waiver cannot be scoped to content it does not belong to. The approver is the acting session.

Status	Cause
201	Waiver recorded; returns it with `active`.
400	Missing justification or expiry, an expiry in the past, or an unusable scope.
404	Unknown snapshot.

`GET /marketplaces/{name}/waivers`¶

Every waiver of the marketplace, newest first, active and lapsed alike. A lapsed or revoked waiver is returned with "active":false — the record of what was once accepted is part of the audit trail.

Status	Cause
200	The marketplace's waivers.
404	Unknown marketplace.

`DELETE /waivers/{id}`¶

Revokes the waiver. It stops suppressing its finding on the next read, so a snapshot cleared only by it becomes blocked again immediately. The row is kept, with its revoker and time.

Status	Cause
200	Revoked; returns the waiver with `active:false`.
404	Unknown waiver, or already revoked.

Continuous re-vetting¶

Re-running the chain over content that is already approved. What a fresh violation does is a deployment setting, not a request parameter — see Re-vetting approved content and the revet configuration block.

`POST /snapshots/{id}/revet`¶

Runs the chain again over the snapshot's pinned content, recording a new run with trigger revet-manual.

{"snapshotId":12,"marketplace":"corp-marketplace","sha":"3f9c2ab…","runId":31,
 "classification":"VIOLATION","outcome":"BLOCKED","revoked":true,"mode":"ENFORCE",
 "uncovered":[{"connector":"secret-scan","ruleId":"aws-access-key-id",
               "location":"plugins/hello/DEPLOY.md:5","severity":"CRITICAL",
               "message":"an AWS access key id is committed in this file"}],
 "affected":[{"principal":"team-payments","fetches":12,
              "lastFetch":"2026-08-14T22:10:00Z"}]}

Field	Meaning
`classification`	`CLEAR`, `VIOLATION` (the chain objects to the content), or `INCONCLUSIVE` (it blocks only because a connector errored, timed out, or has not answered).
`outcome`	The effective vetting outcome after the waivers active at that instant.
`revoked`	Whether this run revoked and unpublished the snapshot. Always `false` in `warn` mode and for `INCONCLUSIVE`.
`mode`	The re-vetting mode in force.
`uncovered`	The blocking findings no active waiver covers — the reason for a violation.
`affected`	Identities that had already fetched this snapshot's content.

Status	Cause
200	The run and what it concluded.
404	Unknown snapshot.
409	The snapshot is not `approved`. Only served content is re-vetted.

`POST /marketplaces/{name}/revet`¶

The same, over every live approved snapshot of the marketplace. This is the operational answer to a scanner rule set or advisory feed that has just moved: the built-in connectors have no feed to subscribe to, so an operator calling this after updating one is how a feed update becomes fresh evidence.

Returns a pass summary — revetted, violations, revoked, inconclusive, and the individual results.

Status	Cause
200	What the pass re-vetted and concluded.
404	Unknown marketplace.

`GET /snapshots/{id}/fetchers`¶

Every authenticated identity that received this snapshot's content through the git facade, with how often and when it last did — the blast radius of a retroactive violation, read from the append-only fetch ledger.

[{"principal":"team-payments","fetches":12,"lastFetch":"2026-08-14T22:10:00Z"}]

Only pack transfers count. A ref advertisement means a client asked, not that it received anything, so counting it would name teams that never got the content.

Status	Cause
200	The identities that fetched the snapshot's content.
404	Unknown snapshot.

`POST /snapshots/{id}/approve`¶

The only endpoint that publishes. Fetches the pinned quarantine ref into the published repository and force-updates refs/heads/main to that SHA.

Takes no request body. A snapshot whose effective vetting outcome is blocked is refused, and the problem document carries both blockingConnectors and uncoveredFindings:

{"status":409,"title":"Vetting chain blocked this snapshot",
 "detail":"snapshot 12 cannot be approved: …",
 "blockingConnectors":["secret-scan"],
 "uncoveredFindings":[{"connector":"secret-scan","ruleId":"aws-access-key-id",
                       "location":"plugins/hello/DEPLOY.md:5","severity":"CRITICAL",
                       "message":"an AWS access key id is committed in this file"}]}

uncoveredFindings is the complete worklist: record a waiver for each entry and the approval succeeds. Every waiver that was in force is appended to the audit ledger as waiver-applied.

A snapshot inside the configured minimum release age is refused by the same status with a different problem document — one nothing in the API can unblock, because it clears itself:

{"status":409,"title":"Snapshot has not reached the minimum release age",
 "detail":"snapshot 12 cannot be approved yet: …",
 "configKey":"skills-gateway.vetting.minimum-release-age",
 "minimumReleaseAge":"PT72H",
 "eligibility":{"snapshotId":12,"eligible":false,
                "firstIngestedAt":"2026-08-16T09:00:00Z",
                "eligibleAt":"2026-08-19T09:00:00Z",
                "ageSeconds":57600,"remainingSeconds":187200,
                "minimumReleaseAgeSeconds":259200}}

Under an enforcing four-eyes rule an approval by an identity on the snapshot's supply side is refused by the same status, with the conflicting acts named:

{"status":409,"title":"Four-eyes rule refused this approval",
 "detail":"four-eyes rule refused approval of snapshot 12: …",
 "configKey":"skills-gateway.approval.four-eyes.mode",
 "conflicts":[{"role":"registered-by","principal":"dana","waiverId":null},
              {"role":"ingested-by","principal":"dana","waiverId":null},
              {"role":"waiver-author","principal":"dana","waiverId":7}]}

Nothing in the API unblocks this one either: a different identity has to approve. Under the default warn mode the same conflicts are detected, the approval succeeds, and a four-eyes-conflict entry is appended to the audit ledger beside snapshot-approved.

Status	Cause
200	Approved; returns the snapshot with `decidedBy` and `decidedAt`.
404	Unknown snapshot.
409	The snapshot is neither `held` nor `revoked`, its effective vetting outcome is blocked, a policy rule denied it, it has not reached the minimum release age, or an enforcing four-eyes rule refused it.

A revoked snapshot is approved through this same endpoint and no other — there is no un-revoke. The gate is unchanged, so the finding that revoked it must be waived or fixed first; the transition records a fresh reviewer and clears the revocation marks.

A blocked snapshot can still be published

The gate is a set of written, attributed, expiring acceptances — not a prohibition. A fully waived snapshot publishes exactly as an ordinary approval does. The difference is that the ledger says which risk was accepted, by whom, and until when.

`GET /snapshots/{id}/release-age`¶

Whether the snapshot has cleared the minimum release age, and when it will if it has not. This is the same computation the approve endpoint gates on, so the two can never disagree.

{"snapshotId":12,"eligible":false,
 "firstIngestedAt":"2026-08-16T09:00:00Z","eligibleAt":"2026-08-19T09:00:00Z",
 "ageSeconds":57600,"remainingSeconds":187200,"minimumReleaseAgeSeconds":259200}

Field	Meaning
`eligible`	Whether the snapshot may be approved now. Always `true` when the gate is off.
`firstIngestedAt`	When this gateway first ingested the commit. The age is counted from here — never from the commit's own timestamp.
`eligibleAt`	The instant it becomes approvable; equal to `firstIngestedAt` when the gate is off.
`ageSeconds`	How long ago the gateway first ingested the commit.
`remainingSeconds`	How much of the window is left; `0` when eligible.
`minimumReleaseAgeSeconds`	The configured window; `0` when the gate is off.

Status	Cause
200	The eligibility record above.
404	Unknown snapshot.

`GET /snapshots/{id}/four-eyes`¶

Whether the four-eyes rule would object to the calling identity approving this snapshot, and what the configured mode would do about it. Decides nothing; the approve endpoint enforces the rule independently.

{"mode":"ENFORCE","refused":true,
 "conflicts":[{"role":"registered-by","principal":"dana","waiverId":null},
              {"role":"ingested-by","principal":"dana","waiverId":null}]}

Field	Meaning
`mode`	`WARN` or `ENFORCE`, as configured. There is no mode that disables detection.
`conflicts`	Each supply-side act the caller performed on this snapshot: `registered-by`, `ingested-by`, or `waiver-author` with the `waiverId` they wrote. Empty for an independent reviewer.
`refused`	Whether an approval by this caller would be refused — true only when the mode is `ENFORCE` and `conflicts` is non-empty.

The waiver clause is evaluated exactly as an approval would evaluate it, over the waivers that are actually suppressing findings on this snapshot right now — which is why this is answered by the server rather than derived by a client.

Status	Cause
200	The record above.
404	Unknown snapshot.

`POST /snapshots/{id}/reject`¶

Mark the snapshot rejected. No repository is touched; whatever was already approved keeps serving. This is also the terminal answer to a revoked snapshot nobody intends to waive.

Same status codes as approve, without its two refusals: neither the vetting outcome nor the minimum release age gates a rejection. Saying no to suspicious content is never something to wait for.

An approved snapshot cannot be re-decided

Both endpoints return 409 for a snapshot that is approved or rejected. The only way out of approved is an enforced re-vetting violation, which the gateway makes, not a caller.

`GET /snapshots/{id}/provenance`¶

Where the snapshot came from and who decided on it.

{"snapshotId":42,"marketplace":"acme",
 "upstreamUrl":"https://github.com/acme/skills.git","upstreamSha":"3f9c2ab...",
 "state":"approved","violation":null,"ingestedAt":"...",
 "decidedBy":"alice@example.com","decidedAt":"..."}

200 · 404 unknown snapshot.

Every action on this page also appends an entry to the audit ledger carrying the acting principal.

Marketplaces and snapshots¶

Representations¶

POST /marketplaces¶

GET /marketplaces¶

POST /marketplaces/{name}/ingest¶

Upstream sync¶

PUT /marketplaces/{name}/sync¶

POST /hooks/{marketplace}¶

Virtual catalog¶

GET /catalog¶

POST /catalog/rebuild¶

GET /snapshots/{id}/content¶

GET /snapshots/{id}/licenses¶

Snapshot preview¶

GET /snapshots/{id}/files¶

GET /snapshots/{id}/file?path={path}¶

GET /snapshots/{id}/diff¶

GET /snapshots/{id}/vetting¶

Vetting waivers¶

POST /snapshots/{id}/waivers¶

GET /marketplaces/{name}/waivers¶

DELETE /waivers/{id}¶

Continuous re-vetting¶

POST /snapshots/{id}/revet¶

POST /marketplaces/{name}/revet¶

GET /snapshots/{id}/fetchers¶

POST /snapshots/{id}/approve¶

GET /snapshots/{id}/release-age¶

GET /snapshots/{id}/four-eyes¶

POST /snapshots/{id}/reject¶

GET /snapshots/{id}/provenance¶

`POST /marketplaces`¶

`GET /marketplaces`¶

`POST /marketplaces/{name}/ingest`¶

`PUT /marketplaces/{name}/sync`¶

`POST /hooks/{marketplace}`¶

`GET /catalog`¶

`POST /catalog/rebuild`¶

`GET /snapshots/{id}/content`¶

`GET /snapshots/{id}/licenses`¶

`GET /snapshots/{id}/files`¶

`GET /snapshots/{id}/file?path={path}`¶

`GET /snapshots/{id}/diff`¶

`GET /snapshots/{id}/vetting`¶

`POST /snapshots/{id}/waivers`¶

`GET /marketplaces/{name}/waivers`¶

`DELETE /waivers/{id}`¶

`POST /snapshots/{id}/revet`¶

`POST /marketplaces/{name}/revet`¶

`GET /snapshots/{id}/fetchers`¶

`POST /snapshots/{id}/approve`¶

`GET /snapshots/{id}/release-age`¶

`GET /snapshots/{id}/four-eyes`¶

`POST /snapshots/{id}/reject`¶

`GET /snapshots/{id}/provenance`¶